What an aggregate report can tell you
A DMARC aggregate report summarizes messages that a receiving mail system saw claiming to be from your domain. It groups similar messages and records how their SPF and DKIM checks turned out. Reports are commonly delivered as XML files, sometimes compressed, to the address specified in your domain’s DMARC record. They are summaries, not copies of messages: they generally do not show message bodies or let you identify every individual sender.
The practical goal is to build a reliable list of services that send mail for your domain. Your regular mailbox provider may be only one of them. A contact form, newsletter platform, billing system, or help desk might also send messages with your domain in the visible From address. An unfamiliar source in a report is worth investigating, but it is not automatically malicious.
Start with the reporting period and message counts
First, check the reporting organization and the period covered by the report. Then look at each group of messages, often called a row. Its count tells you how many messages the receiver grouped together, while its source IP address identifies the system that connected to that receiver. A count describes that receiver’s observations for that period; it is not a total for all mail sent by your domain.
Compare patterns across reports rather than treating a single row as a verdict. A source that appears repeatedly during expected mail activity may deserve closer inspection as a possible authorized service. A large count from an unknown source may deserve prompt attention, but volume alone cannot establish who sent the mail. Reports from different receivers may also group or label traffic differently.
Read SPF, DKIM, and DMARC alignment together
DMARC checks the domain in the visible From address, shown as header_from in many reports. For a message to pass DMARC, either SPF or DKIM must pass and use a domain that aligns with that From domain. SPF checks the sending connection against the domain used for the envelope sender. DKIM checks a cryptographic signature and its signing domain. Under relaxed alignment, related subdomains can generally align; strict alignment requires an exact domain match.
This distinction matters when reading the results. An SPF check can pass for a service’s own domain yet fail DMARC alignment with your From domain. Likewise, a valid DKIM signature from an unrelated domain does not provide aligned DKIM authentication. Inspect the policy_evaluated results alongside the more detailed authentication results when available. A DMARC pass through either aligned method is enough; both methods do not have to pass.
Also note the reported disposition, such as none, quarantine, or reject. It describes how the receiver applied or reported policy for that group, not necessarily what happened to every message in a recipient’s mailbox. A receiver may record a policy override, so an apparent mismatch between the DMARC result and the disposition calls for a closer look rather than an immediate conclusion.
Confirm which senders are authorized
Make an inventory of systems your organization has approved to send mail with your domain in the From address. For each one, compare the report’s source and authentication domains with that service’s documented configuration and the DNS records you control. Ask the person responsible for the service to confirm its sending domain and setup. Do not identify a provider from an IP address alone: addresses can change, and a shared sending system may serve many customers.
If a known service fails DMARC, check whether it is using an aligned DKIM signing domain or an appropriate envelope-sender domain for SPF. For example, a newsletter may pass SPF under its provider’s domain but still need an aligned DKIM signature to pass DMARC for your domain. Forwarded mail can also fail SPF because the forwarding server, rather than the original sender, connects to the final receiver. These cases call for configuration checks, not an assumption that the mail was forged.
Turn findings into a cautious action plan
Sort findings into three groups: confirmed authorized senders that pass, confirmed authorized senders that need configuration work, and sources you cannot yet verify. Keep notes on the relevant domains, approximate counts, reporting periods, and what you confirmed with each service owner. Avoid sharing full reports or internal mail details more widely than necessary, even though aggregate reports do not contain message bodies.
Fix authentication for legitimate services before considering a stricter DMARC policy. Then review later reports to see whether their aligned results improve. Investigate persistent unknown sources, but remember that a DMARC failure shows an authentication or alignment problem, not proof of a particular sender’s identity or intent. Repeating this review when you add or change a sending service helps keep your domain’s mail setup understandable.



